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Abstract
Internet biosurveillance utilizes unstructured data from diverse web-based sources to provide early warning and situational awareness of
public health threats. The scope of source coverage ranges from local media in the vernacular to international media in widely read
languages. Internet biosurveillance is a timely modality that is available to government and public health ofﬁcials, healthcare workers, and the
public and private sector, serving as a real-time complementary approach to traditional indicator-based public health disease surveillance
methods. Internet biosurveillance also supports the broader activity of epidemic intelligence. This overview covers the current state of the
ﬁeld of Internet biosurveillance, and provides a perspective on the future of the ﬁeld.
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Introduction
Internet biosurveillance, or digital disease detection [1], utilizes
unstructured data from diverse web-based sources to provide
early warning and situational awareness of human, animal and
plant infectious diseases, as well as chemical, radiological and
nuclear threats [2]. The discipline emerged in the mid-1990s,
relying primarily on text media for its information, and has
evolved into a globally recognized ﬁeld [3,4]. With the
increasing volume of information and new media types
available via the Internet, the ﬁeld has grown to include social
media, participatory sources, and non-text-based sources. The
scope of source coverage ranges from local media in the
vernacular to international media in widely read languages.
Online ofﬁcial reporting sources are typically used to supple-
ment and verify such informal Internet sources.
Internet biosurveillance is a timely modality that is available
to government and public health ofﬁcials, healthcare workers,
and the public and private sector, serving as a real-time
complementary approach to traditional indicator-based public
health disease surveillance methods [5,6]. Internet biosurveil-
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lance also supports the broader activity of epidemic
intelligence (EI). This review covers the current state of the
ﬁeld, and provides a perspective on its future.
Methods
This is not a ‘systematic review’; rather, this article outlines a
general process of Internet biosurveillance according to
established best practices, and discusses common technologies
employed in extant systems. Each step of the process is
collectively described, drawing upon personal experiences of
system builders and practitioners, as well as published studies.
The authors contributing to this article are either afﬁliated
with Internet biosurveillance systems, are end-users of Inter-
net biosurveillance systems, and/or have published recently in
the ﬁeld. Authors from the following active Internet biosur-
veillance systems are represented: BioCaster [7], the Global
Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN) [8], HealthMap
[9], the Medical Information System (MedISys) (Steinberger
et al., IDRC, 2008, Short and Extended Abstracts, pp. 612–
614, http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/
111111111/13078 (accessed 9 February 2013)), the Program
for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMED-mail) [10], and the
Pattern Understanding and Learning System (PULS) [11].
Results
The process of Internet biosurveillance varies, but, in general,
includes: (i) the collection and storage of data from the
Internet; (ii) processing those data to produce information;
(iii) assembling that information into analyses; and (iv) dissem-
ination of analyses to end-users (Fig. 1). Each part of the
process can entail many technical steps, which are described
below. Information vetting can occur through fully automated,
human-moderated or partially moderated approaches
throughout the process. Multilingual data are managed via
human linguists, machine translation, and natural language-pro-
cessing technology.
Collection and storage
Data sources. Internet biosurveillance systems rely on data
from a variety of sources. Publicly available, informal sources
include text-based news sites (e.g. New York Times and Thanh
Nien News) and social media sources (e.g. Twitter [12],
Facebook, and blogs); more recently, sources that utilize
public input (e.g. FluTrackers, Flu Near You, and crowd-
sourcing platforms [13]) have gained popularity and credibil-
ity. Information from these sources is often available in real
time as an event is developing. This information is validated
and supplemented by ofﬁcial, publically available information
sources (e.g. public health agencies, ministries of health, the
WHO, the World Organization for Animal Health, and the
Food and Agriculture Organization). Systems also may utilize
sources with paid content (e.g. newswires and news aggre-
gators). Audio and video sources provide non-text-based
information. Sources range widely in geographical coverage,
from local to international, and cover all languages with
publicly available media.
Data retrieval. Data are retrieved from the Internet via two
predominant modalities: media aggregators and system-speciﬁc
web monitoring. As an example of the latter, Internet
biosurveillance systems monitor the web by scraping (that is,
speciﬁc web pages are accessed and stored) or crawling (that
is, in addition to storing one speciﬁc web page, links on that
page and links of links are accessed and stored).
Systems re-visit a list of predeﬁned sites at regular intervals
(typically, once to several times each day) in order to process
data in a timely manner for early alerting. For paid or
access-limited content, items might be accessed via a secure
connection. News items from online news sites and social media
are converted to a common format after retrieval, to enable
searching and content mining. Public health agencies and
ministries of health often provide their own feeds with ofﬁcial
information. Feeds from aggregator news sites (e.g. Google and
Yahoo) can be used to provide additional coverage. Content is
extracted from the HTML code, with proper removal of
advertisements and any other irrelevant text.
FIG. 1. The general process of Internet-based biosurveillance.
Human input from information technology, public health and other
experts can occur at any step.
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Social media data stem mostly from Twitter [14] and
Facebook, which can be retrieved via their application
programming interface. Access may be limited to a certain
volume, and is subject to change according to the provider’s
Terms of Service. As some social media users are unaware that
they publish their opinions worldwide, privacy issues arise
under some jurisdictions, even with the publicly available data.
Participatory data can be included via dedicated apps (e.g.
iPhone and Android) or websites where users can leave
comments (e.g. http://www.ﬂutrackers.com/; http://www.
healthmap.org/outbreaksnearme/) [15,16].
Data processing
Once data are retrieved from the Internet, they must be
processed to make them amenable for analysis. We emphasize
that, because different types of users have different needs,
there is no single, overarching goal for the data-processing
step. Nevertheless, the following categories represent impor-
tant steps in biosurveillance data processing: translation,
relevancy ranking, ontology, event extraction, and de-duplica-
tion.
Translation. Although Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Spanish
and Portuguese dominate the world’s online news media, news
of an outbreak event can appear in any language, and is often
reported ﬁrst in a local language. Systems have choices to
make regarding the approach to translation. For example, they
can build customized pipelines for a few languages, or they can
translate each source language into a common target language.
The decision is inﬂuenced by factors such as the availability of
resources in each language, the time available to maintain each
resource, and the translation quality required. For example,
BioCaster employs full text translation ﬁrst and uses only
English language selection algorithms, whereas MedISys and
HealthMap are language-speciﬁc in terms of the keywords
employed to search Internet data. GPHIN employs both
language-speciﬁc keywords and algorithms to extract relevant
data from the Internet and news aggregator databases [17],
whereas PULS employs language-speciﬁc linguistic analysis and
ontologies and inference rules to extract relevant data.
Relevancy ranking. The next stage in processing is to assess the
relevancy of the report according to some measure of the
user’s interest. Deﬁning the user’s interest as a set of
guidelines, a decision tree or as a collection of examples is a
crucial stage in system building, and provides a reference
standard against which to evaluate various algorithms. Once
this has been done, various approaches can be implemented,
including supervised classiﬁers such as Na€ıve Bayes or Support
Vector Machines with learn-to-rank, and Boolean keyword
searches, which include logical operators such as AND and OR
[18]. These techniques are language-speciﬁc, but it is also
possible to deploy automated methods that are language-inde-
pendent, such as clustering followed by automated labelling.
Ontology. Ontologies have proven useful in many domains (e.g.
the life sciences) for structuring relationships between con-
cepts. Biosurveillance requires a conceptual knowledge of
diseases, microorganisms, signs and symptoms, and geography.
A number of ontological resources have been developed or
re-used for public health, although these are not generally as
well known as those in experimental biology or clinical ﬁelds,
such as the Uniﬁed Medical Language System. Among those
developed speciﬁcally for public health are GIDEON (com-
mercial, openly available), BioCaster (open source), and
GPHIN (non-commercial, limited access). Such ontologies
provide knowledge needed by Internet biosurveillance systems
to make intelligent judgements about the terms appearing in
news reports. For example, a mention of Yersinia pestis may
imply that the disease under consideration is bubonic plague.
However, not all ambiguities can be resolved with the static
knowledge contained in an ontology. One of the most practical
problems is toponym disambiguation (i.e. place names). For
example, a mention of a disease outbreak in ‘Cambridge’ might
resolve to any of several places worldwide, including the UK
or the USA.
Event extraction. Once a set of topics of potential interest has
been identiﬁed, speciﬁc biological events are extracted from
the data. This can be accomplished in different ways. As one
example, simple keyword recognition algorithms are often
used to categorize incoming news items. In this approach, an
article is categorized according to predeﬁned keywords (see
example in Table 1). Boolean combinations (e.g. AND, OR,
NOT) and proximity searches (i.e. search for articles where
two or more separately matching term occurrences are within
TABLE 1. Examples of multilingual keywords used for iden-
tiﬁcation of dengue fever in MedISys
Keywords
dengue
Dengueﬁeber
kbxopalr%+leyue
登革熱
ﺗﺐ+ﺩﻧگی
dάcjeιος+pυqesός
Ιός+dάcceιου
knokkelkoorts
febre+hemorragica
ﬁebre+hemorragica
hemorrhagic+fever
…
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a speciﬁed word or character distance) can then be applied
[19].
More detailed aspects of an outbreak can be extracted by
event meta-data extraction, in which the aspects of interest
are known and deﬁned a priori. Examples of commonly
detected aspects include the name of the disease, the species
affected, the date of the outbreak, the numbers of cases and
deaths, and the location of the outbreak. Event meta-data
extraction uses the extensively researched technology known
as information extraction, which is the basis of PULS and
BioCaster [11]. Less common aspects include distal indicators
of political and social response, such as ward closures or the
deployment of international organizations to the affected
region. Often, the techniques used are linguistic patterns
developed with speciﬁc rule systems, but supervised,
semi-supervised and unsupervised machine-learning
approaches have also been evaluated [20].
De-duplication. Effective de-duplication is essential for events
with wide coverage, so that nearly identical stories appearing in
many sources do not overwhelm the user. De-duplication may
involve the detection of reports that are identical in content,
which are handled in practice with clustering techniques as
outlined above. Reports may also be identical in the aspects of
the outbreak that they report. De-duplicating these reports in
practice is challenging, and can require deeper-meaning analysis.
Nevertheless, there are often subtle but important aspects of
an event that may not be easily captured, such as the revision of
victim numbers, the change in a patient’s condition, or a
comparison between a novel and a known agent. De-duplica-
tion should ideally be sensitive to these grey areas, and pass
forward such articles for human analysis.
Data analysis
At this stage of the process, a biosurveillance system will have
produced a structured collection of events that are potentially
relevant to end-users. However, only a subset of these may be
highly useful, given a particular user’s interests. For example, a
case of seasonal inﬂuenza in a celebrity, although widely
reported, may be less relevant than a few reports of a cluster
of novel inﬂuenza among farmers. Given the conﬂict between
the volume of data to be analysed and the limited ability of
humans to review large amounts of information quickly, it is
often desirable to process the articles through an automated
trend and anomaly detection capability in order to increase
throughput and timeliness. The objective is to infer which
events are more urgent or unusual in a timely manner, so that
the user can investigate further and potentially initiate risk
analysis. The challenge is to model what is already known (i.e.
what is normal or expected), and to decide whether the
current event is signiﬁcantly at variance as early as possible.
We focus on two complementary classes of approach in this
section: trend analysis and anomaly detection.
Trend analysis. The temporal nature of Internet biosurveillance
data produces longitudinal patterns and trends. Precursors and
indicators of outbreaks can be tracked over time to show the
precedence of an event before symptoms or the populace pass
thresholds for warning. Timelines can also be used to track
classiﬁers, keywords, locations, or terms, and indicate tempo-
ral traces of events for signiﬁcance against predeﬁned base-
lines. Visualizing topical trends and shifts over time based on
such lexicons can facilitate the detection of unexpected disease
events. Standard time-series algorithms and other signal-pro-
cessing techniques are often used to model these temporal
trends [21–23].
Anomaly detection. Anomaly detection attempts to put the
features of the event into context in order to determine some
level of signiﬁcance. Context is usually considered to be spatial
and/or temporal or a mixture of the two, and can be based on
simple event counts of a particular disease type or on multiple
features of the event. However, in situations where terminol-
ogy begins to specialize or diverge (e.g. ‘mad cow’ to ‘bovine
spongiform encephalopathy’, or ‘swine ﬂu’ to ‘H1N1′), the
anomaly detection can be attenuated.
Dissemination
Achieving the ultimate public health goals of biosurveillance
systems—to facilitate early outbreak detection, thereby
allowing timely interventions, limiting the severity and extent
of spread—depends on the clear and rapid distribution of
information. Internet-based biosurveillance systems use differ-
ent means of disseminating information, depending on user
needs and resources and the nature of the information.
Most systems use a combination of actively ‘pushing’ material
to users and allowing users to ‘pull’ material when desired.
ProMED-mail, one of the earliest Internet-based biosurveillance
systems, uses mailing lists (e-mail) and listserv software, where
users can subscribe to speciﬁc resources (e.g. animal or plant
diseases). GPHIN uses a pushing function to send alerts about
events that have been identiﬁed as signiﬁcant to subscribers.
Some services (e.g. HealthMap) allow users to specify param-
eters for pushed information, such as speciﬁc diseases, catego-
ries of disease, and geographical locations. SMS text messages,
mobile telephone networks and social networks (e.g. Twitter)
actively send information to anyone subscribing to a feed.
In addition, most Internet biosurveillance systems have a
dedicated website where users may query and ﬁlter material
on demand. Although they are passive, websites allow users to
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obtain speciﬁc information when it is needed, and they usually
provide the capacity to search for speciﬁc data (e.g. speciﬁc
disease categories, locations, or time periods). Geographical
mapping, which is automatically generated and displayed by
several current systems, allows users to visualize clustering of
events over time and space. More recently, smartphone apps
have been developed that allow a combination of active and
passive dissemination of information (and also allow users to
report data back to the system).
With the rationale that it is not always possible to predictwho
will need a speciﬁc piece of information, many systems make
their data available freely to anyone. Other systems make their
information available to selected groups or individuals. Selectiv-
ity of dissemination may be based on the need to restrict access
to conﬁdential information (e.g. the Epi-X system of the US
CDC,which is available only to vetted public health ofﬁcials), or a
paid subscription model may be used in order to recoup the
costs of creating and maintaining the system.
Illustration of Internet biosurveillance: Madeira Island dengue
fever outbreak, October 2012
To illustrate how an event is detected and observed to evolve
through the lens of an Internet biosurveillance system,
consider the October 2012 dengue fever outbreak in the
Autonomous Region (island) of Madeira, a Portuguese terri-
tory located approximately 1000 km from the mainland [24]. It
was the ﬁrst dengue outbreak in Europe since 1928. With the
keyword-based approach outlined in Table 1, MedISys [25]
identiﬁed several Portuguese media articles on 5 September
2012, reporting that ‘the mosquito Aedes aegypti struck again in
force on Madeira’ and ‘left pharmacies without repellents and
ointments’ (peak A in Fig. 2) [3,26].
The data showed a sudden increase in dengue fever
reporting in the Portuguese press, and MedISys issued an
alert on Wednesday 3 October 2012 (peak B in Fig. 2). In
more than 40 news articles, two conﬁrmed and 22 suspected
cases of dengue were reported. The story was run in
newspapers in other European Union (EU) countries (Spain,
Finland, etc.) on 4 October (peak C). On 5 October, 34 cases
were reported as conﬁrmed. The story was reported in the
French and Belgian press on 10 October and in the UK press
on 12 October, following a Reuters news wire story. An
update from the Portuguese health authorities (Direcc~ao-G-
eral da Saude) was broadly discussed in the news on 8
November (peak D), and 517 conﬁrmed cases were men-
tioned. The publication of the European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control (ECDC) Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA)
update on 20 November met wide coverage, with over 80
articles being published within and outside the EU on 21
November (peak E).
Internet biosurveillance played an important role in
triggering an early public health response to this event (the
grey bar in Fig. 2). On 3 October, the ECDC noticed a
MedISys automated alert, and immediately began the process
of veriﬁcation by contacting the national health authorities of
Portugal and gathering additional information from external
experts in order to ﬁnalize an RRA for the EU population.
Following this action, on 4 October, preliminary information
about the outbreak was conﬁdentially shared by the
Portuguese health authorities with the EU/European
Economic Area member states through the Early Warning
and Reporting System (EWRS). The EWRS is the EU ofﬁcial
communication restricted web-platform, and enables national
authorities to exchange information on conﬁrmed
communicable disease events of potential international
concern [27].
Early in the outbreak (near peak C in Fig. 2) on 6 October,
the ﬁrst ECDC RRA was internally ﬁnalized, and it was shared
a few days later (10 October) with the EU/European Economic
Area national health authorities through the EWRS. On 11
October, as agreed with the Portuguese authorities, the
ECDC RRA was also made available online for the general
public on the ECDC website [28]. In this outbreak, Internet
biosurveillance played an important role in making interna-
tional public health agencies aware of a potential outbreak
earlier than would have been the case otherwise. This resulted
in an early warning about the risk of infection in travellers
returning from Madeira, where tourism is an important part of
the economy. It also highlighted the risk of importation of
FIG. 2. Media reports on dengue fever on Madeira (number of
articles per day, from 5 September to 21 November, 2012). The grey
bar denotes the initial European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control (ECDC) response to the ﬁrst alert, issued on 3 October 2012
(described in the text).
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dengue virus to continental Europe via air and sea cargo at the
onset of the outbreak [29].
Discussion
Outbreak data for human, animal and plant disease, available
through informal media channels via the Internet, have been
demonstrated to provide detection of anomalous disease
events prior to ofﬁcial reporting [30–32]. In general, Internet
media have the advantage of being timely, comprehensive, and
available in any language from local and international sources.
Such information can help to focus traditional surveillance
efforts, and provides key data that can be used for a range of
important public health purposes [33]. The value and perti-
nence of Internet biosurveillance have been demonstrated
[34–36], and the approach has been integrated into the revised
International Health Regulations [37]. Internet biosurveillance
therefore contributes to early warning and situational aware-
ness, and aims to trigger public health responses to mitigate
outbreaks of infectious disease.
Biosurveillance as an input to EI
Internet biosurveillance has inﬂuenced the way in which EI is
gathered. To meet its objective of early warning, EI typically
combines one or more Internet biosurveillance systems that
are complementary to one another, in order to gain a broad
view of topics and regions of interest. EI is widely used by
national and trans-national public health organizations (e.g. the
US CDC, the ECDC, the Public Health Agency of Canada, the
French Institute for Public Health Surveillance (InVS), and the
WHO) to strengthen their early detection functions [38–40].
The scope of EI and its ﬁnal objective are broad, and vary
according to the mandate and objectives of the implementing
institution. For example, EI can be adapted to speciﬁc goals,
including the early detection of public health emergencies, of
speciﬁc infectious diseases only [1], and of public health events
during mass gatherings [41]. Nevertheless, core functions and
EI can be deﬁned as the process of early detection, collection,
veriﬁcation, analysis and organization of information in relation
to public health events [42,43]. EI processes integrate both
formal and informal sources of information (e.g. Internet
biosurveillance and traditional public health surveillance).
From the end-user perspective, the ﬁrst EI step is the
detection of pertinent raw signals. Ofﬁcial sources of health
information (e.g. ministries of health, and surveillance net-
works) are typically easily identiﬁed, and their content is meant
to support public health analysis. However, access to these
may be difﬁcult and constrained (for example, the information
may be available only in the national language, and access to the
information may be restricted), and their frequency of
publication may not be appropriate for early disease detection.
Therefore, informal sources (e.g. Internet media, discussion
forums, and social networks) often represent the main source
of signals. To collect and process large volumes of such
material requires the use of Internet biosurveillance systems.
From the many raw signals observed from Internet
biosurveillance systems, EI teams select information according
to selection criteria deﬁned by their public health institution.
Following this, signals are veriﬁed; it is this veriﬁcation phase
that discriminates biosurveillance from EI. Veriﬁcation consists
of conﬁrming and supplementing available information from
additional and reliable sources, which are mainly networks of
public health experts such as public health institutes, interna-
tional institutions such as the WHO, World Organization for
Animal Health, and ECDC, regional networks such as
EpiSouth, laboratories, and non-governmental organizations.
Once veriﬁed, events are analysed to assess potential public
health signiﬁcance and potential national and/or international
implications. Each is considered within its context and in the
light of available scientiﬁc knowledge regarding spread, sever-
ity, and the efﬁcacy of appropriate control measures [44].
Finally, following this analysis, the detected health threats are
communicated to alert health authorities and to inform the
public health community.
Needs for future research
Above, we have described the current state of the ﬁeld of
Internet biosurveillance, from data collection to data utilization
for EI. Internet technology has signiﬁcantly advanced the
disease surveillance landscape; however, gaps in biosurveillance
processes exist, and many challenges lie ahead in the ﬁeld;
some of those are described below.
Real-time signal detection. Sifting through the vast array of
multimedia information on the Internet in real time is
challenging. The noise of non-speciﬁc reports and misinforma-
tion complicates signal detection. Moreover, identifying anom-
alous activity without an established multi-year baseline of
reporting for a given disease in a particular region is an
obstacle. Anomaly detection is a capability in some biosurveil-
lance systems at present, but there is a need for more robust
anomaly detection approaches, including better entity extrac-
tion, visual analytical modalities, clustering methods, etc. [45].
Moreover, more work is needed on capturing and analysing
the data from multilingual sources through linguistic algorithms
or automated translation.
Data analysis. Internet biosurveillance data typically cannot be
analysed with traditional epidemiological approaches, owing to
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a lack of timely data veriﬁcation and validation. For example,
recognizing false-positive and false-negative events is problem-
atic, owing to the lack of ofﬁcial comparison data or delays in
diagnostic testing [33]. Frequencies of reports or events are
often used for anomaly detection. However, identifying a
common denominator (e.g. reports, events, articles, and
sources) for analysis, and assigning a weight to sources based
on accuracy, scope, and publication frequency, are not well
established.
Collaboration, networking, and participatory epidemiology. Public
self-reporting of events is increasingly recognized as beneﬁting
disease detection. Extracting the data from participatory
platforms (e.g. FluNearYou, Twitter, and Facebook) and
utilizing it for early detection and surveillance is a critical area
of current focus. For example, DIZIE, a project developed at
the National Institute of Informatics in Tokyo, Japan, is used to
visualize the extent to which Twitter data can detect/track
infectious disease outbreaks [46]. More work is needed in this
area, as health information sharing on social networking
platforms has become proliﬁc [47]. Users and public health
experts can utilize this data in real time to track and assess
disease situations [48].
Platforms with user-customizable features based on their
speciﬁc needs and interests may make participatory modalities
more attractive to a wider range of users. Also, more
interactive functions for users (e.g. scoring option and comment
ﬁeld), may facilitate user interactions and information dissem-
ination. An example of sharing and networking is the fully
functional system for early alerting and reporting of potential
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events that has
been developed by the Global Health Security Action Group
through an extensive collaboration between the Joint research
Centre of the European Commission and a team of risk
assessment specialists from the G7+ Mexico countries [49].
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